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Abstract
The aim of this paper is an analysis of the commercial policy implemented by 
the colonial bureaucracy on the Guarani Reductions, also the adaptations, res-
ponses and conflicts this process originated. The historical sources are analyzed 
from an anthropological perspective. First, the colonial commercial policies 
applied on the Guarani missions are put in context. Second, the controver-
sies within the colonial administration are interpreted. Finally, indications of 
indigenous participation in this trade is described. The bias found in the offi-
cial documents is a limitation of this study. Its value, however, lies in an analy-
sis which brings together regulations, conflicts and indigenous agency. It is 
concluded that the political mediation designed to hinder the missionary po-
pulation’s free access to the new commercial system had the opposite effect.
Keywords: Bourbon bureaucracy, commercial practices, Guarani Missions, Río 
de la Plata frontiers.
Resumen
El objetivo del artículo  es analizar el modelo mercantil de intervención bor-
bónica en las reducciones guaraníes atendiendo a las adaptaciones, respuestas 
y conflictos derivados. La metodología utilizada es el análisis de fuentes histó-
ricas desde una perspectiva antropológica. En primer lugar, se esclarecieron   
las directrices borbónicas del libre comercio en las misiones guaraníes. En 
segundo lugar, se plasmaron las controversias existentes entre las autorida-
des coloniales. Por último, se dieron indicios de la participación indígena en 
dicho comercio. Las limitaciones estuvieron dadas por el sesgo de las propias 
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fuentes oficiales. El valor del estudio reside en la realización de un análisis articula-
do a partir de las normativas, los conflictos y la agencia indígena. Se llegó a la con-
clusión de que la intermediación política configurada para obstruir el libre acceso 
de la población misionera al nuevo sistema mercantil  generó un proceso contra-
rio. Asimismo, que este proceso se dio dentro de un poder colonial fragmentado. 
Palabras clave: burocracia borbónica, prácticas mercantiles, reducciones guaraníes, 
fronteras de Río de la Plata.
Introduction
In 1788, the intendant governor of Buenos Aires, Francisco de Paula Sanz, asked 
departmental Hispanic authorities in the Guaraní missions under his jurisdiction to 
inform him of the profits or losses of commercial operations in those towns. One 
of the issues that concerned him was the coming and going of merchants from 
neighboring districts without any apparent controls; they brought beverages and 
sold communal products at low prices, purchasing other goods privately without any 
consideration for necessity or convenience. The responses to his request expressed a 
range of opinions and positions. Many testified to the competing interests of Hispanic 
authorities and the Guaraní of the missions. They also demonstrated the labyrinthine 
paths the commercial operations had followed in the reductions after the expulsion of 
the Jesuits. In this regard, open trade had generated a set of unintended consequences 
that were intensified by the existence of an unprepared administrative bureaucracy 
interested in obtaining additional benefits. 
A general view of the problem brings to mind the implicit contradictions associated 
with the utopia of the market, with issues that were particular to the era. Written 
ordinances introduced, regulated and oversaw the commercial practices of the 
missions.1 They had been conceived by Governor Francisco de Bucarelli, who had 
been in charge of the expulsion of the Jesuits, with the objective of regulating, among 
other things, the new political economy of the Guaraní.2 With certain differences, 
the subsequent regulations and directives reproduced the links between commerce, 
progress, happiness and equality contained in the category of “enlightened commerce.” 
Despite early warnings that the mission economy had drastically deteriorated, none of 
1 The Jesuits had structured the economy of the missions based on certain patterns of Guaraní organiza-
tion. Once the towns of the reductions were founded, the Ignatians organized a system of family and com-
munal production. The first consisted of the cultivation of subsistence products on parcels of land obtained 
by families based on their membership in a parcel or chiefdom. The second was based on production on 
commonly held lands, with the objective of obtaining goods to be stored, exchanged with other reductions 
and traded regionally. The commercialization process was centralized in the hands of the Jesuits. Profits 
from the sale of products such as yerba mate served to cover taxes paid to the Crown; support the priests; 
pay the salaries of the members of the indigenous town council; purchase goods and tools not produced 
internally; and fund the construction, investment and maintenance of buildings, workshops and various 
facilities, among other things.
2 At that time, the Guaraní reductions comprised a complex of thirty towns located on what are now the 
borders of Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. Around the date of the expulsion, they were populated 
by 90 000 people in a zone that was historically disputed with the Portuguese in Brazil, located on roads 
and waterways connected to the principal ports and markets of the Río de la Plata region.
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those involved in regulating, intervening in or consulting on the issue objected to the 
buying and selling of mission products, in large part because they were involved.
In this article, we propose to analyze the ideological foundations of the Bourbon 
model of intervention in mission commerce, demonstrating both the different 
concepts at play and the conflicts of interest among various bureaucratic and colonial 
authorities. The intention is to highlight, in particular, the controversy generated 
by the free circulation of Spanish merchants within the missions and also to discuss 
contested perspectives regarding the participation of the Guaraní population in the 
buying and selling of reduction goods. In this regard, we start from the hypothesis that 
political and administrative mediation based on the supposed indigenous inability to 
trade actually generated the opposite effect: the Guaraní population participated in 
the market through unregulated trade in livestock and the acquisition of goods that 
were hidden from administrators. Allusions to these practices, although indirect, were 
rampant in officials’ arguments about control of mission resources.3 
Disputes over the destiny of the resources of indigenous communities are part of the 
larger problematic colonial history of the Americas. In this sense, much research has 
examined the effects of mercantile colonialism in Latin America, focusing on various 
situations with regard to regional economies, fiscal pressures, labor demands, cacique 
structures and communal strategies. Various studies have also explored indigenous 
participation in mercantile circuits in crucial viceregal zones and marginal jurisdictions 
as well as in urban and rural spaces and frontiers of colonization.4 In particular, by 
increasing control over local commercial networks and seeking greater tax revenues, 
Bourbon reforms encouraged communal economies. For its part, Río de la Plata, given 
the border situation with Portuguese colonies, experienced the combined effects of 
both Bourbon and Pombaline reforms in the context of renewed competition for 
control of markets, indigenous labor, resources, waterways and productive spaces.
The Bourbon reform project, in its multiple strands, was applied to the Guaraní 
missions after the expulsion of the Jesuits, with particular contradictions. The 
installation of a Spanish administration, the openness of the missions to different 
commercial interests, and the arrival of new residents unleashed a profound 
deterioration of the reduction complex. Specialized historiography has delved 
extensively into the negative impacts of this process on the towns, including 
population loss, mortality and flight, the deterioration of relationships of ethnic 
authority and administrative misappropriation, among other issues (Maeder, 1992; 
Poetniz & Poetniz, 1998).5 This happened in the context of growing external 
3 Consideration of indigenous participation is based on the official documentation, enriched by non-linear 
research perspectives such as that expressed through Walter Benjamin’s (1982) notion to brush history 
against the grain. 
4 Worth mentioning is the compilation by Jorge Silva Riquer and Antonio Escobar Ohmstede (2000), the 
publication coordinated by Silvia Palomeque and Fernando Jumar (2007) and the dossier compiled by 
Sara Ortelli (2011). In particular, it is interesting to note those studies that demonstrate economic exchan-
ges within illegal or informal circuits as part of the mercantile realm, as well as the configuration of “border 
markets” based on them (Cavieres, 2011).
5 In a recent work, Julia Sarreal (2014) presented a proposal different from that traditionally adopted by his-
toriography, highlighting that, in a context of crisis, the preferences and adaptations of the Guaraní played 
an important role by assuming modalities of access to resources of a more individual nature. This, in turn, 
was related to resistance to the coercive system of communal production; this resistance was expressed 
in escapes and complaints about the abuses of the Spanish administrators and Guaraní corregidores.
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demand for leather, which led to the exploitation of mission cattle.6 It was also in the 
context of the occupation of the land surrounding the missions, especially farms in 
the ranching towns, and the desire for Guaraní resources by individuals and public 
officials (Caletti, 2015). 
Based on the analysis of the positions of local and viceregal officials overseeing 
mission commerce and based in Buenos Aires, we seek to account for ideological 
controversies and competition for pueblo resources among different colonial 
authorities. This will begin with a description of the model of economic intervention 
expressed in the ordinances of Governor Francisco de Bucarelli, followed by an 
investigation into the reappropriations carried out by Spanish officials and the mission 
population amid conflicts for the benefits of commercialization. It is important, as 
well, to consider the indirect references to indigenous participation found in the gaps 
in the documents.7 Indigenous agency was part of the argument made by colonial 
authorities regarding profits or losses due to the presence of merchants in the towns, 
and it was also referred to when condemning individual trade or sales of goods without 
the intervention of Bourbon bureaucracy.
The Legal Framework and Economic Model
After the expulsion of the Jesuits, the Guaraní missions were transformed into a 
paradigmatic experiment of the new Bourbon colonialism, which aligned the main 
ideologies of enlightened reformism and border reformism (Lucena, 1996).8 The 
governor of Buenos Aires, Francisco de Paula Bucarelli (1766-1771), who was also 
responsible for carrying out the expulsion of the Jesuits from the jurisdictions under his 
control, was in charge of designing the regulations for the new era of administration, 
government and assimilation of the mission population. The government’s 
“Instructions” for the Guaraní missions were based partly on the ordinances created by 
Pombaline reformism for the Amazonian indigenous peoples previously administered 
by the Jesuits (Maeder, 1987). This adaptation, which revealed a common ideological 
basis, responded to the governor’s need to develop ordinances that would guarantee 
the transition, over just a few months, from the religious administration associated 
6 The change in livestock exploitation occurred due to the uncontrolled expansion of cattle for hide and 
clandestine round-ups of steer from the missions for Brazilian mining markets, setting the pace of a li-
vestock industry that was essentially for personal consumption, was speculative and predatory, and was 
focused on the Atlantic markets (Moraes, 2007).
7 In this regard, Sara Ortelli proposes a broader methodological perspective on the study of the economic 
practices of indigenous populations based on methodological alternatives that shed light on “certain gaps 
difficult to grasp through the documentation that is regularly utilized in economic history” (Ortelli, 2011, p. 4). 
8 After the expulsion of the Jesuits, the thirty reductions were kept under the same regime but divided into 
two districts, that of Paraná and that of Uruguay, within the jurisdiction of Buenos Aires. In 1774, new grou-
pings were created, with the towns made subordinate to the departments of Santiago, Candelaria, San 
Miguel, Yapeyú and Concepción. With the Royal Ordinance of Intendants, the departments of Santiago and 
Candelaria became dependent on Paraguay, and the departments of Yapeyú, Concepción and San Miguel 
became dependent on the Intendancy of Buenos Aires. The occupation of the department of San Miguel by 
Portugal in 1801 marked a watershed that intensified with the general impact produced in this territory by the 
independence wars.
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with the old regime to another, more enlightened and modern regime. For Bucarelli, 
this management, which had an unforeseen impact in Río de la Plata and the mission 
district, was but a negligible step in his military career. As a military nobleman with 
traditional training, he resented the oversight of the Viceroy of Peru, Manuel de Amat 
y Junyent, the latter being “more modern” than he was.9
In spite of everything, he was able to translate into the ordinances the new 
ideals of social organization with physiocratic tendencies, which were adapted to a 
mercantilist, centralist and royalist colonial model for the purpose of introducing 
“free trade,” gaining access to communal goods and collecting taxes.10 For this 
purpose, the productive, navigational and demographic control of a broad region 
populated by one of the largest indigenous conglomerates in the viceroyalty was to 
remain under the absolute sphere of influence of the Spanish crown. Free trade that 
was broad and fluid was seen as a necessary step in the evolution of modern states, 
a new cult that would bring wellbeing to the different juridical-social strata and that 
through fiscal means would bolster the royal coffers. The new commercial policy 
that, in the region in question, would assume its general form after the creation of 
the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata was overturned through an architecture built on 
Bucarelli’s ordinances for the missions. In this regard, the governor claimed that 
they were elaborated:
Desiring as a consequence of everything that said natives, with the freedom they 
have recovered, achieve free trade with the surrounding provinces, through 
which they will not only become civilized and enjoy the benefits of rational 
society, but will also gain the advantages and utilities of making use of the fruits 
that nature produces for them.11
Trade without theoretical restrictions would be constituted on the basis of all the 
projected transformations for this new phase of Iberian colonialism in the region.12 
However, its application in this case would require certain adaptations. On one hand, 
with regard to the exchange currency: 
9 After the expulsion of the Jesuits from the mission region, Bucarelli wrote to the Count of Aranda, presi-
dent of the Council of Castile, requesting that he release him for “among other dislikes, being under the 
orders of a viceroy who is more modern than I at all levels and in a government as subaltern as this one 
after the distinguished authorities I had in Spain” (Carta de Francisco de Paula Bucarelli y Ursúa al señor 
conde de Aranda, 1768, p. 10v).
10 In this case, the concept of “free trade” precedes the “Regulation on Free Trade” (1778) developed by 
Carlos iii to permit free commercial exchange between Spain and its American colonies, which was pre-
viously cut off by the monopoly existing in certain ports or mercantile zones. It considered the economic 
doctrines assiduously disseminated from Europe and the recent successes in North America (Wallerstein, 
2004, p. 303). 
11 “Instruction to be made by the interim Governors that I shall name in the Indian towns of Uruguay and 
Paraná, there being no contrary disposition of His Majesty Francisco Bucarelli y Ursúa, Candelaria, August 
23rd, 1768” (Bravo, 1872, p. 324). 
12 Sacred commerce was also conceived in the ordinances as a mode of communication and friendship 
between states as a way of transcending mere subsistence, as a way of accumulating goods and in turn 
property and inheritance, as an axis for strengthening the family as a new social foundation, and as the 
highest expression of freedom of action by individuals, societies and states.
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The currency not being in circulation in the towns of Uruguay and Paraná, as 
it is not yet possessed in the Spanish cities closest to said towns, it is necessary 
that in the meantime they carry out trade in the same way that they do, 
swapping and trading the fruits they gather for the items they need (Bravo, 
1872, p. 325).
On the other hand, modifications would have to be imposed in the way they would 
materialize. In this regard, although Bucarelli emphasized that freedom was “the soul 
of commerce,” the benefits of “reciprocal trade” between the Guarani and Hispanics 
were only possible given the “genius,” “character” and “aptitude” of the “natives” 
through political and administrative mediation. From this paternalistic and colonialist 
perspective, “complete freedom” would be “fatal and prejudicial” for the Guaraní in the 
towns, who had to be “sheltered by following laws for adults that do not make sense.” 
The “indispensable intervention” would be done through Hispanic administrators 
who would watch over their “goods and contracts” with “zeal and integrity.” One of the 
highlighted aspects was that to form a commercial contract at a “fair price,” the parties 
were required to be able to speak, read, write and count in Spanish. As the majority of 
the population spoke only Guaraní, not only was freedom impossible, but Spanish was 
also to be taught “to the youth,” and the use of their own language was prohibited by 
teachers paid with the fruits of the community. The other primary issue was that lack of 
practical knowledge would lead the “Indians” to be adversely affected by the “natural 
cunning and sagacity of all merchants” and even that of the Spaniards and Creoles 
with whom they would now coexist (Bravo, 1872, p. 326). For this, the ordinances 
stipulated the establishment of a system of mutual controls.13 
Oversight would be carried out, on one hand, by the indigenous council of each 
of the thirty towns, with special interference by the Guaraní corregidor (mayor) and 
in extraordinary circumstances the protector of natives, a Spanish administrator who 
would supervise the system in case of imbalances, conflicts or denunciations. On the 
other hand, oversight was carried out by Hispanic administrators in each reduction, 
including departmental lieutenant governors, a general governor of the missions and 
a general administrator in Buenos Aires, “manager of the businesses of the indians 
and dative guardian of their goods,” who with a preliminary deposit would ultimately 
manage the whole system, not only receiving all the registers of commercial activity in 
the towns but also making general decisions based on a profit percentage (Bravo, 1872, 
p. 337). Complex engineering was established to supervise and oversee transactions, 
fix the value of goods, and evaluate which products to sell and buy according to 
the productive specificity of each town and the necessities and conveniences of the 
community. Meanwhile, it sought to coordinate the exchange of agricultural products, 
livestock, hides and manufactured goods with the neighboring provinces of Asunción, 
13 This mutual control pointed to commercial practice itself but also to the storing of goods in communal 
warehouses that remained locked, the keys being in the possession of the corregidor and mayordomo 
(both from the indigenous cabildo, or town council) and the Spanish administrator.
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Corrientes, Buenos Aires and Santa Fe.14 This was aimed at invigorating the internal 
market, redirecting the regional benefits previously amassed by the Jesuits toward the 
metropolis through the productive potential of the towns. To regulate this exchange, 
district lieutenants were named, and they served under the supervision of the general 
intendancy of Buenos Aires and the governor general of the missions. Finally, the 
communal funds of the town would pay the salaries of the employees and the taxes.
Bucarelli, however, weighed the possibility of forming local-level alliances for 
the purchase and sale of products while skirting Buenos Aires’ controls. In this 
sense, the concern was both the evasion of sales tax payments to the public treasury 
and the absence of a satisfactory negotiation regarding the objectives of achieving 
mission self-sufficiency. Also worrisome was the loss of control over the “hire” of 
indigenous labor for transporting individuals in canoes and carriages without 
proper wage payments. Finally, it was unsettling that merchants were constantly 
entering the towns, interrupting the productive logic. The underlying problem 
consisted of the deep-rootedness of regionalized powers that limited metropolis’ 
access to the potential extractive benefits of their American colonies. Bourbon 
centralism, represented here by Bucarelli, sought to undo this system of restricted 
intermediations in the context of major changes in ideas about government. 
Expectations about this change were placed on a new model of bureaucracy, one 
that was loyal to royal interests and would ideally oversee the population for tax, 
labor and productive purposes and limit the impacts of local political dynamics on 
conflicts of interest among colonial officials. 
Disputes Over Resources and Cross-Accusations
The policy of commercial openness, implemented under a false renewal of the 
conditions, links and freedoms gained by the indigenous population of the towns, 
brought multiple imbalances and declines. Far from being a source of wellbeing, it 
affected the basic conditions of subsistence. On one hand, the mission population, 
in the presence of new social actors, became fragmented as an internally structured 
community and diversified its responses to the new routes of access to products and 
the introduction of new goods. In this regard, during Jesuit times, the missions were 
structured around an economy of commercial exchange controlled by the missionaries, 
14 The commercialization of yerba, tobacco, sugar, honey, linen and cattle from the towns in exchange 
for domestic essentials, such as clothing, tools, salt and oil, would be done by merchants entering the 
towns or through the shipment of products to or from the administration of Buenos Aires and vice versa 
via waterways. The merchants could only enter the towns in the months of February through April so as 
not to interfere with the harvests and other labor overseen by administrators (Bravo, 1872, p. 324; Informe 
solicitado por el superintendente general, Francisco de Paula Sanz, sobre la introducción de bebidas y 
efectos de comercio en los Pueblos de Misiones guaraníes, 1788 and 1789). 
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in which gaps existed for trade outside the environment of the reductions.15 The 
change lay in the fact that according to Bucarelli’s ordinances, the purchase and sale of 
products was installed as a central axis of the economy, marked daily ties, broadened the 
sphere of interaction with other spaces, put mission goods in play—particularly cattle 
resources, as well as land—and divided society. On the other hand, the administrative 
leadership did not channel an idealized framework of mutual benefits.16 
Conflicts between the different government and administrative powers for control 
over economic benefits and political privileges grew after the creation of the Viceroyalty 
of Río de la Plata in 1776, and with the decree of free trade. The first symptom was 
an extensive dispute between the administrator general for economic affairs, Juan 
Angel de Lascano, in Buenos Aires, and the governor of the missions for political and 
military issues, Francisco Bruno de Zabala, who was based in the town of Candelaria. 
The conflict expressed rivalries and personal interests as well as disagreements with 
Buenos Aires, as the capital of the new viceroyalty, for establishing a centralized logic of 
obedience where regional political powers had long taken precedence. In this way, the 
missions, in addition to concentrating extensive resources coveted by the surrounding 
society, formed a scenario of political struggles where encountered governances were 
dissolved.17 For its part, the mission territory assumed greater visibility with the Límites 
Expedition, derived from the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777), which began the task of 
demarcation in the early 1780s.18 Finally, struggles over the definition of benefits and 
interference in the mission space intensified with the creation of the royal intendancies 
in 1784.
Within this context, in 1785 the new intendant governor in Buenos Aires, Francisco 
de Paula Sanz, developed ordinances to reinforce the control and supervision 
of commercial activities in the towns.19 Three years later, he requested the three 
15 On the other hand, trade as the exchange of goods by people outside the group and through shared 
transactional codes was an identifiable practice among the societies of the Lowlands, even among rival 
groups. These practices, coupled with colonial logic, gave rise to the so-called “rescues” in Río de la Plata. 
Meanwhile, within the realm of the Jesuit reductions, certain levels of individual exchange continued both 
within and outside the mission space, beyond the centralization and control of the economy by the religious 
figures (Haubert, 1991; Susnik, 1965). 
16 It should be clarified that one thing brought about by the new regime of colonial administration was the 
residence in the missions of new social actors who, due to their prerogatives, lifestyle and economic inte-
rests, generated new layers of internal inequality and new forms of violence. 
17 Guillermo Wilde (2009) analyzes this issue in particular. In this regard, he examines a visit to the towns in 
1775 by order of the governor of Buenos Aires, Juan José de Vértiz y Salcedo, in which the friars consulted 
referred extensively to the overlapping of political jurisdictions inside and outside the towns (Wilde, 2009).
18 The treaty was signed to resolve border rivalries with the Portuguese, who were added as competitive 
actors in the Río de la Plata area.
19 The main adversary of Buenos Aires’ centrist policy was Governor Zabala. In this regard, Sanz wrote in 
a letter to him that: 
Because of the disagreements between Vm and the lieutenant governors of the depart-
ments of San Miguel and Concepción, having originated from one and the other the uni-
versal disorder of these towns according to what has been recounted to me and not per-
mitting its continuation, I warn you for the second time to abstain from intervening and 
mixing directly or indirectly with the knowledge of communal goods of said seventeen 
towns under your care, freely leaving their administrators to manage them subject to the 
orders and methods (Carta de Francisco de Paula Sanz al Sr. Gobernador de los Pueblos 
de Misiones, 1786, p. 2v). 
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departmental government lieutenants to report in detail on the “profits or losses 
experienced by the natives of the towns” in the purchasing of different products, as 
“at some time and without any intermediation, different merchants come to this area 
bringing bills for clothing and other effects” (Informe solicitado por el superintendente 
general, Francisco de Paula Sanz, sobre la introducción de bebidas y efectos de comercio en los 
Pueblos de Misiones guaraníes, 1788 and 1789, page 1). Of particular concern were 
untaxed exchange, which implied tax evasion; the introduction of unauthorized 
beverages; and the acquisition of products on an individual basis, without abiding 
by rules regarding price and quality. The responses to the request captured the 
competition over resources between the administration in Buenos Aires, the governor 
of Missions, the departmental government lieutenants, the administrators of the towns 
and the Guaraní corregidores through cross-accusations made between them. However, 
they also described the multiple activities and modalities generated by commercial 
openness and through which indigenous agency, despite the constant denial of it, was 
indirectly mentioned.20 
The reports requested by Sanz regarding potential losses due to the excessive 
presence of merchants in the towns were diverse and marked contrasting positions; 
they represented a range from radical positions regarding the damage suffered, to 
more conciliatory opinions, to total defense of the acquisition of goods through 
merchants based on their association with the wellbeing of the towns. The two 
antagonistic views, controlled mercantilism and open mercantilism, were at once 
represented by subjects aligned, respectively, with a centralized government in 
Buenos Aires in opposition to an autonomous mission government. The first group 
included the lieutenant governors of San Miguel and of Concepción, Manuel de 
Lasarte y Esquivel and Gonzalo de Doblas. The departments were separated by 
the Uruguay River, and their towns were near the border with the Portuguese. An 
intermediate position, more conciliatory, was expressed by the lieutenant governor 
of Yapeyú, Pedro Castellanos, who was in charge of the southern towns located along 
the Paraná and Uruguay rivers and those of the ranches that extended from the 
Uruguay River toward the Atlantic, which were rich in cattle. Finally, the defense of 
the free entry of merchants into the towns was sustained insistently by the governor 
of missions, Francisco Bruno de Zabala. The governor had initiated his mandate 
in 1769 with jurisdiction over the thirty towns; after that initial concentration, his 
jurisdiction was steadily reduced by Buenos Aires to curtail and fragment his power 
within the mission district (Figure 1).21
  
20 The alleged “incapacity of the Indians” was the mechanism of domination that sought to obstruct free 
access by the mission population to the new mercantile system in a context of the freeing of economic 
relations.
21 After the creation of the viceroyalty, its chief representative, Pedro de Ceballos, requested reports on the 
state of the towns, as did the governor of Buenos Aires, Juan José de Vértiz y Salcedo. Although their re-
sults were alarming, the most concrete measures pointed to cutting the jurisdiction and power of the gover-
nor of missions, Francisco Bruno de Zabala, and replacing the administrators who had been denounced 
for embezzlement. To a large extent, there was an attempt to displace Zabala from the local control he had 
over the economic affairs of the missions in a dispute that originated with the then general administrator 
of Buenos Aires, Juan Angel de Lascano. Zabala remained as governor of Missions, although with less 
authority than he enjoyed initially, until his death in 1800. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Guaraní reductions, 1771
Source: Furlong (1936).
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To defend their positions, they appealed to sensationalist associations that 
dramatized the profits or losses from the free circulation of merchants in the towns. 
Although none recognized the sale of beverages, which did occur, the strongest 
detractors described the sale of merchandise in exchange for the “fruits of the 
country” as a “plague and ruin.” From the start, Manuel de Lasarte y Esquivel, 
lieutenant governor of San Miguel, insisted that losses from inadequate sales 
of products could be avoided by “circulating this capital in the communities or 
places that benefit from their profits” (Respuestas al “Informe” de Manuel de Lasarte y 
Esquivel, 1788, pp. 1v, 2 and 2v.). In this regard, he explained that “the communities 
of Indians are exempt from the duties paid by the Spaniards to get products out 
of the capital” and that as “every merchant charges their negotiation services, it 
is detrimental to the communities to buy these loads, especially when the goods 
have already been passed from second and third hands from one town to another.” 
Likewise, he clarified that: 
Although they come with what may be of use to the Indians, at the same 
time, they bring things that make them idle and unproductive and many 
that given a precise consideration of the condition and situation of the towns 
are luxurious and profane and should be avoided with due consideration 
(Respuestas al “Informe” de Manuel de Lasarte y Esquivel, 1788, pp. 1v, 2 and 2v).
Based on this, he stressed the need to sustain “a narrow, invariable succession of 
dependencies under the responsibility of the corregidores, cabildos [town councils], 
administrators” (Respuestas al “Informe” de Manuel de Lasarte y Esquivel, 1788, p. 2v). 
The reference to a succession of controls was an argument used to defend the idea 
that lieutenant governors should be the ones to oversee compliance. In line with this 
thinking was Gonzalo de Doblas, lieutenant governor of Concepción, who recalled 
that “the ordinances establish that merchants should enter from February to April, but 
they have entered and continue to enter at all times,” and “as much zeal as there is, 
they must fool the Indians, cause distractions, and have illicit alliances.” He stated that 
the merchants “largely maintain themselves at the cost of the towns, and when they 
finally leave, they take Indians, boys and even Indian women, removing them from the 
towns, never to return again.” As a solution, he proposed “the absolute prohibition of 
merchants with their wares in these towns, allowing only those that bring cattle and 
horses” and that “the administrators not buy anything for the consumption of the 
community from those that may come from Buenos Aires.”22
Taking an intermediate position, the lieutenant governor of Yapeyú, Pedro 
Castellanos, stated that sales were to be carried out with “equity of price in exchange 
for cattle and hides resulting from the beef cattle that are killed for consumption 
by the community,” and only with his authorization (Respuestas al “Informe” de Pedro 
Castellanos, n.d., p. 3). This obscured unregulated commercial practices and above 
all a lack of adaptation to the criteria for the preservation and reproduction of 
22 The goods acquired most frequently were wax, paper, oil, vinegar, iron, steel, tools, ponchos, hats, han-
dkerchiefs, breeches, wool, cotton, sugar, honey, spices and salt (Respuestas al “Informe” de Gonzalo de 
Doblas, 1788, pp. 4 and 8v). 
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cattle. Finally, the governor of Missions, Francisco Bruno de Zabala, connected the 
acquisition of commercial products with “the happiness and abundance of said towns” 
and remarked on the “importance of free trade” without mediation because:
What is brought to be sold to them will stimulate these natives to apply 
themselves to work and labor, and above all, they will not lack supplies and the 
abundance and supply of the country, as has occurred in the other kingdoms, 
and hence, those who are able will take advantage of the occasion and in 
communities that can never be supplied with everything they need will be 
able to find a better way to provide for themselves. For the towns do not have 
any surplus to store for general restocking to which shipments are added, and 
meanwhile they must pay the merchants while their dependents remain in 
the towns and among their neighbors, protecting them from risk when they 
do not wish to be exposed to it, freeing them from delays and the expenses of 
transit, and achieving deals with the Spaniards for the means of which there 
are many advanced Indians. The alliances and sacred bonds I have sheltered 
will endure because they are the way in which they understand that they are 
treated no differently from any other of His Majesty’s vessels (Carta de Francisco 
Bruno de Zabala al virrey Nicolás de Arredondo, 1790, p. 16). 
Zabala possessed a deeper knowledge of regional dynamics and the details of 
exchange in the mission region than many other officials who had arrived in the 
Americas more recently.23 He also possessed information about the complexities 
involved and practices derived from the commercial transactions, such as the issue of 
waterways, for which they relied on the mission populations; vessels deteriorated, costs 
increased, and the arrival of products was delayed. However, his arguments obscured 
personal interests, as with his insistence on free exchange with the merchants, 
which he defined as “sacred bonds” but which related to dealings he had with them 
(Hernández, 1999; Maeder, 1992). This fact, added to the ideology of “assimilating” 
the indigenous population into colonial society as a supposed act of equality, took 
on another dimension upon observing mutual accusations. In this regard, Doblas 
in his allegations referred to the management of commerce by administrators and 
merchants in terms of a “monopoly” consolidated under the shelter of Governor 
Zabala and sustained, together with Lasarte y Esquivel, the importance of the general 
administration for the purpose of controlling commercial circulation in the missions. 
In their defense, the administrators of the towns, who were also consulted, pointed to 
the Guaraní corregidores as the principal agents of this exchange.24 For his part, Zabala, 
23 Francisco Bruno de Zabala was the son of the Spaniard Bruno Mauricio de Zabala, governor of Buenos 
Aires (1717-1734). He had participated with the Spanish troops who joined the Límites Expedition (1753), 
which was formed to put into practice the Treaty of Madrid (1750), as well as the army that fought the 
resistance of the towns and the Jesuits to leaving seven of their reductions under the orders of the treaty. 
Finally, he was among the captains and soldiers who occupied the eastern towns for several years after 
the Battle of Caybaté (Bruno, 1991; Maeder, 1992; Quarleri, 2009).
24 Pedro Fontela, the administrator of the town of Concepción, in response to the request said that if “the 
natives” had “dealings with merchants,” it was without his consent, and that “the first contravener in this 
issue is the corregidor” (Respuestas al “Informe” del administrador Pedro Fontela, 1788, p. 8). 
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faced with the general administration, had previously been questioned, first by the 
intendant governor of Buenos Aires, Francisco de Paula Sanz, and later by Viceroy 
Arredondo for not having:
Yet executed said report; however, the time that has passed since it was offered 
has seemed to me to recall it while at the same time preventing me from being 
told with all clarity and reason whether or not the introduction of goods and 
effects of commerce prohibited by this superintendancy is convenient for the 
benefit of the towns (Carta de Nicolás Arredondo al gobernador de Misiones, 1790, 
p. 12v.). 
Following the Viceroy’s intimation, Zabala provided an extensive response, in which 
he included Gonzalo de Doblas in a dispute that transcended the discussion regarding the 
wellbeing of the mission population, insisting on:
The importance of free trade and the private interests that move to weigh 
the losses that with good intention and by obligation can be avoided and 
contained given proper union and subordination, which is necessary on the 
part of the lieutenants governor, and that these abstain from executing what 
Gonzalo de Doblas has been linked to in purchases and sales by negotiation, 
as confirmed in the secret inquiry that I created and remitted in the original 
based on orders from above (Carta de Francisco Bruno de Zabala al virrey Nicolás 
de Arredondo, 1790, p. 15).
Additionally, he justified delays, such as the ungovernability of the territory due to 
the rupture in the obedience system and a lack of collaborators, alleging the need to 
have “an advisor, a secretary, a lieutenant protector of natives, and that these are Indians 
with which I have a lot of work” (Carta de Francisco Bruno de Zabala al virrey Nicolás de 
Arredondo, 1790, p. 15). Both the exploitation of communal goods by sectorial efforts 
and control of the circulation of goods from the viceregal capital expressed substantive 
political power over commercial exchange in a way that was similar to the forced 
distribution of goods imposed in Indian towns in the central areas of the Hispanic 
American viceroyalties. In this way, the model of mercantilist interventionism in the 
missions represented one of many contradictions in the modernizing project of the 
Bourbon reforms because based on the notion of commercial openness, it maintained 
systems of political, economic and punitive coercion to stimulate the internal market, 
generate sectorial benefits, sustain the bureaucracy and add to the royal treasury.25 
The mercantile expansion generated commercial alliances between ethnic authorities, 
Spanish officials and merchants that provoked changes in the dynamics of communal 
production and the incorporation of new forms of consumption and modalities of 
participation in commercial markets.
25 In this sense, as Guillermo Madrazo states, “the priority given to the economic objectives of the metropo-
lis implied that the modernizing project would be undertaken with ‘political and social payment of doubtful 
character,’” especially with regard to the indigenous towns (Madrazo, 2005, p. 30).
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Reappropriations, Differential Logic and Indigenous Agency
One of the paradoxes of the new economic model was the implementation of free trade 
that was also linked to the need to maintain the administrative bureaucracy created 
to trade with the towns. This circularity was a result of the intention to appropriate 
the energy, goods and lands of one of the most important productive and human 
communities existing in the region. On one hand, regulations that were developed 
to organize commercial exchange acted as a legal framework of reference only in the 
discursive sense. Based on the requested reports, daily political and economic realities 
were instead structured around constant adaptations and the alleged differences 
between the towns, as well as their state of poverty, lack of provisions, high costs, level 
of disobedience, complicities and monopolies.
On the other hand, although the commercialization of goods was accompanied 
by official documentation, which emphasized ideas associated with “regulating 
consumption,” “valuation,” “precaution,” “utility,” “justice,” “equanimity”, “order” 
and “equity,” the reiteration of these notions without a change in policy expressed 
incongruences between the ideological foundations and the resulting economic 
dynamics. This situation also reflected a form of domination built on the gap between 
protectionist discourse and the governmental methods instituted to oversee the 
population and its resources. The model, although it foresaw ways of overseeing the 
movement of goods; establishing accounting records, trading periods, and types of 
routes and transport; selecting marketable goods for each town; and evaluating the 
quality of goods to be acquired, did not entail a comprehensive vision. Two decades 
after the implementation of the system, Gonzalo de Doblas stated that exchange, 
consumption and supply existed in the missions with “neither rule, nor economy” 
(Respuestas al “Informe” de Gonzalo de Doblas, 1788, p. 4). 
One of the aspects that emerges is the contrast between modalities and cultural 
ideas of consumption from the Bourbon perspective: rationality combined with a 
lack of control. From the first reports, observations were made in relation to the 
notion that the Guaraní “spent” their resources until “they ran out.” However, the 
logic of stockpiling goods in warehouses and the subsequent distribution responded 
to policies that the Jesuits had imposed on the predominant consumption 
practices among the Guaraní reductions. The Jesuits, in their chronicles, noted the 
discrepancies mentioned and the implementation of a system of daily deliveries of 
rations, particularly beef and clothing, as a means of sustaining a daily presence 
in the towns. This practice continued after the expulsion on feast days and during 
“faenas” (collective work projects) as a transitory policy. The objective was to replace 
it with incentives for family production and the effects derived from the commercial 
impulse itself. However, the equation was not seen in practice, and the rations as a 
mainstay of access to basic goods were not substituted. The problem was that cattle 
and other goods began to decline, and rations were increasingly scarce, generating 
a food crisis. Added to this was the lack of local production of cotton for making 
clothes and the gradual deterioration of homes. 
As no currency had been coined, cotton had since Jesuit times been the primary 
means of exchange and of payment of salaries and perks. This generated greater 
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labor pressures in the post-expulsion period, particularly for women, who had since 
the origins of the reductions been responsible for spinning yarn. This was expressed 
in an increase in weekly quotas by administrators and lieutenant governors. Cotton 
shortages and the imposition of obligations changed the capacity for production. In 
a report after his visit to several towns, the governor of Missions, Francisco Bruno 
Zabala, observed that: 
The Indian women, due to the three tasks of spinning that they are given each 
week, do not have time to make any cloth with which to dress themselves and 
their children, nor to help their husbands on their chacras [farms], which are 
abandoned when they go to work in the town, and they do not have enough 
to feed themselves properly (Visita a San Apóstoles de Francisco Bruno de Zabala, 
capitán de Regimiento de Dragones de Buenos Aires y gobernador de los Treinta Pueblos, 
de 1787, p. 3).
These imputations crystallized the crisis of the economic system of the missions, 
as well as the damage manifested by the “husbands” regarding their wives’ rights 
to work, even the wives of caciques, in a relationship of gendered subjugation and 
domination where pre-Hispanic traditions were juxtaposed as Western models of 
Jesuit and colonial Iberian origin.26 The supply crisis, caused by a lack of production 
and investment and to embezzlement, deepened, in turn, as a consequence of 
the incongruences derived from the commercial practices carried out by Hispanic 
officials.27 One of these consisted of the purchase of ribbons, ponchos and hats 
in exchange for bulls and oxen and the purchase of the latter “with urgency and 
bad price” based on the argument that they were essential for working the land 
(Respuestas al “Informe” del administrador Pedro Fontela, 1788, p. 8). Cotton, on the 
other hand, was obtained in exchange for yerba, generating greater pressure on 
the work of indigenous women in the mate plantations, especially in the towns 
of the Intendancy of Paraguay. In this way, they began to buy products that were 
previously produced internally in exchange for community goods that they would 
come to need later.28
The production of goods in the wheat fields and on the mate plantations and 
the tasks of spinning were structured around a punitive system based on physical 
punishment. In this context, in January 1788, the cacique of the Guaraní town of San 
Lorenzo announced before the Hispanic authorities of the mission complex that his 
26 A first approach to this problem was presented in the paper “Violencia física y control de los cuerpos: 
trabajo, género y poder en pueblos indígenas fronterizos de fines del siglo xviii” (Quarleri, 2017). 
27 It should be clarified that the administrators who responded to the report requested by Intendant Go-
vernor Francisco de Paula Sanz (Pedro Nolasco Alfaro of San Carlos, Francisco Martínez Lobato of San 
José, Miguel de Pereyra of Apóstoles, Thomas Gómez of Santos Mártires, Pedro Antonio Nieto of San 
Javier, Domingo Bermúdez of Santa María La Mayor, and Pedro Fontela of Concepción) mostly recogni-
zed that the merchants sold products to the Guaraní on a private basis but stated that they did so without 
their knowledge. 
28 Zabala stated that what was most scarce was cotton, “being able to have it from the harvests” (Visita a 
San Nicolás de Francisco Bruno de Zabala, capitán de Regimiento de Dragones de Buenos Aires y gober-
nador de los Treinta Pueblos, 1787, p. 3). 
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wife, María Irapayu, had been “beaten on the backside” as a form of punishment by 
order of the indigenous corregidor after missing one day of work on the wheat harvest, 
the harvest being part of her communal obligations (Provisión del teniente de gobernador 
de este Departamento de San Miguel, Don Manuel de Lasarte y Esquivel, por la queja dada por 
el cacique Don Agustín Guairaye, pueblo de la Real Corona titulado San Nicolás de Bari, 1788). 
The lieutenant governor, at odds with the corregidor of that reduction and the governor 
of the thirty missions, presented additional testimony showing that other women had 
also been whipped as a form of punishment for being absent from the corn harvest. 
This was not an isolated case. On the contrary, there were constant accusations, 
generating an extensive body of documentation, after which the “need” to regulate 
punishment was raised. Authorities established a typology of punitive practices, such 
as incarceration and flogging, and instituted frameworks of legitimate action that only 
served to normalize physical violence as a disciplinary mechanism for the purposes of 
the production model.29
Within this context, the “flight” of the people was one of the most forceful responses 
to the coercion they experienced. However, because the escapees were punished, the 
resistance also expressed itself strategically in everyday actions, especially in the sphere 
of work and commerce. This was manifested, in part, through the reappropriation 
of certain practices of exchange and access to goods that inverted and displaced the 
objectives implicit in the political economy expressed by Bucarelli in his ordinances.30 
In this regard, while this policy was based on the negation of the indigenous capacity to 
intervene in commercial dealings with merchants or other agents in the mission space, 
indigenous participation was channeled by rejecting certain strategies associated with 
family productivity and coercive and abusive work through the generation of their own 
commercial practices. One of the main viewpoints that was resisted was that of Western 
economic “rationality” for the stockpiling and distribution of consumer goods.31 While 
this opposition was related to the old Jesuit practices of stockpiling and distribution, it 
was made even more apparent under the new Bourbon mercantile economic policy, as 
the latter emphasized the benefits of the purchase and sale of products, in contrast to 
the delivery of daily rations. 
Another aspect that was opposed was control over access to dairy farms, the 
consumption of livestock, and the commercialization of cattle and hides by the 
29 Through a royal charter in 1778, it was established that “in punishments for the faults and errors com-
mitted by the Indians regarding the haciendas, town works and the construction of chacras, no more 
intervention should be given but to report these to the corregidor and the cabildo, requesting remedy with 
moderate punishment” (Reglas para el mejor gobierno de los guaraníes, 1788, p. 4v.).
30 Julia Sarreal, in her book on the economy of the missions, infers based on economic documentation 
that, as of the 1780s, the independent acquisition of goods for daily consumption had acquired prominence 
over production on communal lands. Practices used to gain access to foodstuffs included the hunting of 
wild game and the gathering of yerba mate in the forest; at the same time, there was a decline in cotton 
cultivation, which was widely resisted by the Guaraní (Sarreal, 2014).
31 Ideas about wellbeing, the proper use of time, exchange and consumption had been the subject of 
tensions since Jesuit times. The same was true of the exchange of goods, because although these ex-
changes were supervised by the Jesuits, there were cases in which the Guaraní traded products with their 
neighbors, the Charrúa, the Guenoa or the Portuguese, with various objectives (Catafesto, 2002; Meliá & 
Temple, 2004; Quarleri, 2013). 
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general administration or the local government, particularly in ranching towns such 
as Yapeyú and San Miguel.32 The open rejection of interference in livestock resources 
by Bourbon officials manifested in 1778 in the well-known “Mutiny of Yapeyú.”33 
Meanwhile, cattle smuggling was the principal counterpoint to the ideal of commerce 
promoted by the Bourbon administration from Buenos Aires, given that it constituted 
the main source of wealth in the Rio de la Plata area and the most valuable asset in 
commercial exchange (Caletti, 2015; Moraes, 2007).
“Clandestine commerce,” as the Hispanic authorities called it, was the enemy of 
“enlightened commerce,” which was based on the openness of deals with surrounding 
provinces controlled from the viceregal capital. In the case of the Jesuit missions, 
trade was instituted across borders by virtue of existing passages and ports as well as by 
proximity to the Portuguese forts and the surrounding multiethnic settlements. This 
trade was achieved at the expense of “the best cattle that serve their conservation and 
development” to sell hides, fats and fodder (Carta del Virrey marques de Loreto a Francisco 
Bruno de Zabala, 1788, p. 11v). Local and transatlantic demand for leather constituted 
the basis of this persistent trade. Trade was also done with horses from the ranches 
in each town.34 The ranches of the southern towns were especially prone to disputes 
with Creole colonists who occupied bordering strips of land, and also to the constant 
looting of cattle by both criminals and “escaped” Guaraní who would later sell the 
cattle to the Portuguese. 
However, the central issue that concerned the general administration and that 
had motivated Sanz’ report was that, despite all the speculation and systems of 
control, merchants entered the towns whenever they wanted and traded directly 
with the population. Private acquisitions were more common in some reductions 
than others. This was related to their location—some being transit points and others 
being distant—as well as the position taken by administrators and corregidores and the 
availability of surpluses for trade coming primarily from family chacras [farms]. The 
merchants usually offered products on account, generating future debts, in exchange 
for various tasks that guaranteed their continued presence in the towns, or also in 
exchange for cattle, hides, yerba mate and linen. In their defense, administrators 
claimed they did not know when these exchanges were conducted.35 They also 
insisted on the difficulty of controlling private acquisitions, arguing that these were 
32 Erich Edgard Poetniz, in a work published in 1983, provides a detailed analysis of the economy of 
Yapeyú, a town that had the largest cattle reserves in the mission complex. Making note of the changes 
that occurred in the post-Jesuit period, the author states that while Yapeyú initially provided income that 
satisfied the general administration of Buenos Aires, in 1784 that income began to decline because the 
residents preferred to negotiate directly with merchants arriving from Paraguay (Poetniz, 1983). 
33 In November 1778, the lieutenant governor of Yapeyú, Juan de San Martín, ordered the establishment of 
a dairy farm to bring wild cattle to the mission ranches. The individual in charge of creating it, the cacique 
and second mayor, Melchor Aberá, did not do so and was jailed. This was met with an uprising by several 
caciques, after which Viceroy Vértiz intervened (Hernández, 1999).
34 Manuel de Lasarte y Esquivel stated that some native Indians from San Juan and San Nicolás were 
accused of stealing horses from the ranch in San Nicolás to bring to the port of San Juan and from there to 
the ranch in San Borja. From this town, trade was carried out with the Portuguese in Río Pardo (Carta del 
teniente de gobernador Manuel de Lasarte y Esquivel a Francisco de Paula Sanz, 1788, p. 11v.).
35 It was “an old custom they had regarding sales by individuals in town about which I more than repeatedly 
advised them to inform me” (Respuestas al “Informe” del administrador Miguel de Pereyra, 1788, p. 7). 
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carried out behind their backs.36 This argument was reiterated by the administrator of 
Concepción, who stated that “if the natives have had dealings with the merchants it is 
without the administrator’s knowledge, despite the fact that he has let them know in 
their own language” (Respuestas al “Informe” del administrador Pedro Fontela, 1788, p. 8v.). 
In general terms, the idea was established that the purchases were made in secret to 
divert suspicion away from administrators and indigenous corregidores, but at the same 
time, the existence of such purchases was confirmed.
From another sphere, the lieutenant governor of the department of Concepción, 
Gonzalo de Doblas, recognized that the Guaraní constantly carried out individual 
commercial dealings but remarked that they concealed the purchases “so that it would 
not be known that they were not as poor as they appeared, so that the community will 
assist them” (“Informe” de Gonzalo de Doblas, 1788, p. 4). In contrast, Zabala defended 
individual purchases and stated, “if they buy in secret, it is not to hide poverty and be 
provisioned by the stored goods because this is for the neediest.” For the governor, 
the purchases were linked to a “natural desire to acquire” that, although questionable, 
demonstrated that purchases of goods were made independently of political control 
and were based on individual decisions and needs triggered by the loss of capacity in 
communal production, as well as the new conception of consumption and the value 
of certain goods (Carta de Francisco Bruno de Zabala al virrey Nicolás de Arredondo, 1790, 
p. 16v). 
This new consumption, as well as responding to colonial influence determined 
in large part by interethnic coexistence, opened a gap within the towns between the 
“more Castilian Indians” and those who had not adopted the new “habits and customs” 
along these lines. Toward the end of the 18th century, the colonial administration 
distinguished between those who knew how to “negotiate and contract,” spoke Spanish 
and had incorporated other European customs, such as wearing certain clothing. 
Some of the latter, with previous intervention by administrators and priests in the 
towns, were freed from communal duties following the decree of Viceroy Aviles in 
1800 (Nominas de naturales propuestos para libertad, elaboradas por administradores y curas 
de los pueblos, 1799 and 1800).
Final Considerations
In investigating the ideological foundations of the model of Bourbon intervention 
in the mission economies, based on the instructions of Governor Bucarelli, we 
encounter extensive arguments regarding the utopian benefits of free trade among 
states, provinces and towns. These conceptions belonging to Bucarelli’s era, which 
went beyond his affinity for the reforms led by Viceroy Amat, were clearly designed to 
be applied in the reductions, despite the enormous paradox that economic freedom 
was not granted to the Guaraní communities without intermediations. However, 
36 “Without there being things that the Indians would need they would also buy them with their fruits (…) 
without the administrator being able to remedy them because they hide it, and although I will take all possi-
ble care to avoid these contracts (…) I doubt I can avoid them” (Respuestas al “Informe” del administrador 
Pedro Nolasco Alfaro, 1788, p. 6v). 
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analyzed within a larger context, the commercial openness of the mission towns was 
not only the result of the idealized plan expressed by Bucarelli in his ordinances; on 
the contrary, it was a product of the convergence of multiple factors. One of these 
was the very dynamic that had been developing prior to the expulsion of the Jesuits 
as a result of demographic growth and the growing demand for livestock resources. 
Another major element was royal interest in the benefits derived from local resources 
and labor through their circulation within the internal market, and in the associated 
tax payments. Also influential was the assimilationist turn of the reformist colonialism 
of the era, which was weighed against the evaluation that the segregationist policy 
deployed by preceding monarchies and dynasties was not only in conflict with the 
new modernizing paradigms but had also demonstrated its ineffectiveness. Finally, it 
motivated a mercantilist scenario that fueled a contradictory narrative regarding the 
reign of the colonialist variant of commerce, over which the sectorial interests of the 
participating actors clashed. 
The commercial model in the missions would face not only the reappropriations, 
rejections and subversions carried out by the Guaraní themselves but also interpretations 
and adaptations to personal interests carried out by officials in their local and viceregal 
jurisdictions. From different fronts, they sought to access agricultural resources, 
livestock, leather and manufactured goods that were previously monopolized by the 
Jesuits and to open the trade to the neighboring provinces of Asunción, Corrientes, 
Buenos Aires and Santa Fe. However, Buenos Aires, as a new viceregal headquarters, 
sought to direct the logic of regional benefits through an unusual intervention. The 
logic of appropriation was also reproduced in the mission environment. Thus, while 
the mission departments—which fell under the jurisdiction of the Intendancy of 
Buenos Aires—argued, based on either strategy or conviction, about the disadvantages 
brought by the direct contact between the Guaraní and merchants, the governor of 
the missions, who had the most experience in the Río de la Plata area and took a more 
regional view of the issue, defended to Buenos Aires the freedom of the contracts and 
of unrestricted entry into the reductions by neighboring merchants. 
From both perspectives—on the one hand, denying the indigenous people the ability 
to complete commercial transactions with merchants or other agents in the mission 
space, and, on the other, openly lauding this commerce for its ties with the merchants 
from neighboring jurisdictions—indigenous participation finally expressed itself on 
its own terms. In general, the indigenous people channeled this by rejecting certain 
strategies associated with family productivity and coercive and abusive labor, as well as 
through the generation of their own commercial practices. One of the main tenets they 
resisted was that of Western economic “rationality” for the collection, consumption 
and communal production of certain crops. Individual decisions were prioritized. 
Another way they expressed their rejection of supervisory guidelines was “clandestine 
commerce,” the primary enemy of “enlightened commerce.” In sum, adaptation to 
the new structures and ties; resistance to old and new practices; individual or family 
responses within a progressive dismemberment of cacique cohesion; and the use of 
multiethnic commercial circuits, such as the commercialization of cattle, became ever 
more evident in the face of the blurred boundaries of a fragmented colonial power.
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